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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

Melvin Jeremy Savage appeals from the

district court’s

order summarily dismissing his

post-conviction petition, and from the district court’s order denying his I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion
for relief from judgment.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings

Savage

set a

ﬁre

at the

home ofhis eX-Wife’s attorney. (#43474 PSLI

and her husband, an Idaho Falls police ofﬁcer, were home
unharmed.

(Id.)

The Idaho

State Police

had previously

at the

pp.4-9.)

time the ﬁre was

installed a surveillance

The attorney

set

but escaped

camera near the

residence due t0 recent vandalism committed 0n the ofﬁcer’s patrol vehicle parked outside.
p.4.) This Video,

arsonist. (Id.)

and surveillance Video from a nearby gas

station,

helped identify Savage as the

The attorney Whose home was burned had a no-contact order

upon a telephone harassment charge brought approximately one month

associated With a civil lawsuit brought

by the arson

Pursuant t0 an agreement With the

misdemeanor

1

2016

earlier.

(Id.)

in

While the

a deposition

Victims. (R., pp. 1 5-16, 74-128.)

state,

Savage pled guilty t0 ﬁrst-degree arson,
order.

E

WL 2595962 at *1 (Idaho App. 2016) (unpublished); (#43474 PSI, p.3).

The

stalking

State V. Savage,

against Savage based

was pending, Savage made incriminating statements

criminal proceeding

(Id.,

(amended from felony

Contemporaneous with

this brief, the state

stalking),

and Violation of a no-contact

ﬁled a motion requesting that

this

Court take judicial

notice of the clerk’s record, reporter’s transcripts, and PSI associated With Savage’s direct appeal,

Docket No. 43474.

agreed t0 dismiss other charges.

state

19-year sentence With four years
*1.

The

(E #43474 PSI, p.3.)

ﬁxed

for ﬁrst-degree arson.

district court granted, in part,

The

district court

E m,

imposed a uniﬁed

2016

Savage’s subsequent I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction 0f

sentence and reduced the indeterminate portion 0f the ﬁrst-degree arson sentence

Q On
*

1

appeal, the Idaho Court

WL 2595962 at

oprpeals

rej ected

by one

Savage’s challenge t0 this sentence.

year.

E

ﬂQ

at

-2.

Savage next ﬁled a pro se post—conviction petition and supporting factual declaration.
pp.7-22.)

Savage raised four claims, including, relevant

ineffective for failing to stay the

pending

completion of the criminal proceeding.

civil

t0 this appeal, that his trial counsel

(R.,

was

proceeding and associated deposition until the

(R., p.21.)

In the petition, Savage alleged that prior t0 the deposition, he asked his court-appointed

counsel in the criminal case Whether the deposition could be postponed, 0r Whether he could assert
his Fifth

Amendment

rights

and refuse

t0

answer questions

at the deposition.

(R., pp.16-17.)

According to Savage, his appointed counsel informed him that he could “probably not” postpone
the deposition, and that if Savage refused to participate 0r answer questions, the opposing party

“would get a Court Order from Judge Watkins

that

would

require [Savage] to answer

all

of their

questions under the penalty of perjury.” (R., p.16.) Savage further alleged that as a result of his

trial

counsel’s failure to stay the civil proceeding, he participated in the deposition,

made

incriminating statements, and ultimately chose to accept the state’s plea offer. (R., pp.17-19.)

The
(R., p.148.)

district court

appointed counsel t0 represent Savage in the post-conviction proceeding.

Appointed counsel ﬁled a supplement t0 Savage’s post-conviction petition which

amended and clariﬁed Savage’s

claims.

now

claim as described above as

(R.,

pp.179-181.)

asserting that trial counsel

“effectively advise [Savage] of the application 0f the 5th

Article

I

was

ineffective for failing t0

Amendment 0f the

U.S. Constitution and

Section 13 0f the Idaho Constitution.” (R., p.180.)

The
206.)

The supplement amended Savage’s

state

ﬁled a motion for summary dismissal and

With respect t0 Savage’s

memorandum in

support. (R., pp. 1 84-

ineffective assistance of counsel/Fifth Amendment claim, the state

argued that Savage failed to raise a prima facie case because his petition indicated that
did discuss Savage’s Fifth Amendment rights with him, and because implicit in his
statements, as reported by Savage,

and refuse
Savage

to

answer questions

was that Savage could assert his right

at the deposition.

pp.189-190.)

(R.,

trial

counsel

counsel’s

against self—incrimination

The

state also

argued that

failed to allege facts demonstrating Strickland; prejudice. (R., p.190.)

The
counsel.

state

(R.,

supported

pp.195-204.)

its

motion for summary dismissal With an afﬁdavit from Savage’s

In the afﬁdavit,

trial

counsel stated

informed Savage that he had n0 authority to intervene in the
discussed the possibility 0f Savage asserting his Fifth

that, if

trial

Savage did refuse

t0 the

civil

that, prior to the deposition,

he

proceeding; that he and Savage

Amendment

answer the deposition questions,

trial

rights at the deposition;

this

would

and

likely only delay the

deposition, and could result in a court order requiring Savage t0 participate, which, in turn, could

result in

imposed costs and

fees

response t0 the state’s motion.

2

Strickland

V.

and a contempt ﬁnding.

The

district court

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

(R.,

pp.200-201.) Savage did not ﬁle a

granted the motion for

summary

dismissal,

concluding that Savage failed t0 establish a prima facie case with respect to any of his claims. (R.,
pp.213-221.) Savage timely appealed. (R., pp.224-225.)

Savage,

still

I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)

represented

motion for

by counsel

relief

in the post-conviction proceeding, then

from judgment.3

asserted that his post-conviction counsel abandoned

ﬁled a pro se

(R.,

pp.226-251.)

In the motion, Savage

him

in the course

of the post-conviction

proceeding, and that this resulted in “unique and compelling circumstances” which entitled

relief.

(Id. (citing

district court

Eby V.

State,

148 Idaho 731, 228 P.3d 998 (2010).)

referenced the fact that Savage had

made pro se

him to

In a subsequent order, the

ﬁlings, but stated that

it

would not

consider any motions 0r requests not ﬁled through Savage’s counsel 0f record. (R., pp.297—298.)

3

Savage also cited other Idaho Rules 0f Civil Procedure in the motion. (R., pp.226-237.)
However, based upon the arguments made in both Savage’s motion, and in Savage’s Appellant’s
On
brief, the state construes the motion as an I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment.
appeal, Savage has not alleged that the district court erred With respect to any other arguments
Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-17.)
Which may be construed from the motion.

(E

ISSUES
Savage
I.

states the issues

Whether the

on appeal

as:

district court erred

When

it

summarily dismissed Mr. Savage’s

claim that he only pled guilty as a result of Mr. Grant’s inaccurate and

incomplete advice about his Fifth Amendment rights.

II.

Whether the

district court

abused

its

discretion

Savage’s motion for reconsideration because
attorney

Who

by

it

refusing to consider Mr.

had not been ﬁled by the

Mr. Savage was alleging had abandoned the representation.

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues

Has Savage

failed to

claim that his
his Fifth

2.

trial

on appeal

as:

show that the

district court erred

by summarily dismissing his
him of

counsel was ineffective for failing to effectively advise

Amendment rights?

Has Savage

failed t0

show

that the district court erred

by

failing to consider the

merits of his I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment?

ARGUMENT
I.

Savage Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred BV Summarilv Dismissing His Claim
That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing T0 Effectively Advise Him Of His Fifth

Amendment Rights
A.

Introduction

Savage contends

that the district court erred

petition. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-12.) Speciﬁcally,

dismissal of his claim that his

trial

by summarily dismissing

Savage challenges the

his post-conviction

district court’s

summary

counsel was ineffective for failing to effectively advise

him 0f

his Fifth Amendment rights against self—incrimination as they pertained t0 his civil case deposition.

(Id.)

A review of the record appears t0 reveal that Savage raised a prima facie case,

respect the Strickland deﬁciency prong of this claim. However, this Court should
district court’s

summary

in part, with

still

afﬁrm the

dismissal order because Savage failed to allege facts demonstrating

Strickland prejudice.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“On review 0f a

dismissal 0f a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary

hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue 0f material fact exists based

pleadings, depositions and admissions together With any afﬁdavits

144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007).

on ﬁle.” Workman

on the

V. State,

w

Savage Has Failed T0 Demonstrate Strickland Preiudice With Respect To the Challenged

C.

Post-conviction proceedings are governed

LC.

§

19-4901, et seq.

by the Uniform Post—Conviction Procedure Act.

A petition for post-conviction relief initiates

a

new and independent

proceeding in Which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he

Workman, 144 Idaho

at 522,

164 P.3d

at

802; State

V.

is

civil

entitled t0 relief.

Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d

548, 550 (1983).

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction
relief, in

response to a party’s motion 0r on the court’s

own

initiative, if the applicant

“has not

presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims upon

which the applicant bears the burden 0f proof.” Berg
739 (1998). Until controverted by the
are, for

state, allegations in

131 Idaho 5 17, 518, 960 P.2d 738,

a veriﬁed post-conviction application

purposes of determining Whether t0 hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed

m, 96 Idaho

542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). However, the court

either the applicant’s

mere conclusory

applicant’s conclusions of law.

Roman

V. State,

V. State,

Farrier

allegations, unsupported

V. State,

is

true.

Cooper

V.

not required to accept

by admissible evidence,

0r the

135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001);

125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).

contained in a post-conviction petition are insufﬁcient for granting relief

Further, allegations

when they

are clearly

disproved by the record of the original proceeding or do not justify relief as a matter of law.

Workman, 144 Idaho
870, 873 (2007).

at 522,

164 P.3d

at 802;

Charboneau

V. State,

144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d

A post-conviction petitioner

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel

both deﬁcient performance and resulting prejudice.

Strickland,

466 U.S.

at

W

must demonstrate
687-688;

Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).

An

attorney’s performance

is

not constitutionally deﬁcient unless

objective standard 0f reasonableness, and there

is

A

fair

V. State,

falls

below an

a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

within the wide range 0f reasonable professional assistance. Gibson

718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis

it

V. State,

is

110 Idaho 63 1, 634,

116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).

assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

made

t0 eliminate the

distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances 0f counsel’s challenged conduct,

and

t0 evaluate the

conduct from counsel’s perspective

“[S]trategic choices

made

after

at the time.

Strickland,

466 U.S.

at 689.

thorough investigation of law and facts relevant t0 plausible

options are Virtually unchallengeable

....”

Li. at 690.

The second Strickland prong requires a petitioner to demonstrate “a reasonable probability
that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different.

A reasonable
Strickland,

probability

466 U.S.

at

is

a probability sufﬁcient to undermine conﬁdence in the outcome,”

694, which “requires a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood 0f a

different result,” Cullen V. Pinholster,

omitted).

563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (internal quotations and citation

A reviewing court “must consider the totality 0f the evidence before the judge or jury,”

Strickland,

466 U.S.

at

695, and reweigh that evidence “against the totality of available mitigating

evidence,” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 197 (quoting Wiggins

V.

Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003)).

In Hill

V.

Strickland prejudice prong

Pursuant to

guilty.

ﬂ,

t0

is

be applied Where, as in

a petitioner

deﬁcient performance “there

is

is

required to

this case, the

show

More

V.

(9th Cir.

not ask Whether, had he gone t0

the result of the plea bargain.

.

..

trial,

ﬂ, 474 U.S.

him

at 59;

ﬂ

211$

1985).

that,

“[W]hen a defendant

t0 accept a guilty plea rather than

the result of that trial

would have been

go

t0 trial,

different than

We instead consider whether the defendant was prejudiced by the

denial of the entire judicial proceeding to

_,

trial.”

United States Supreme Court has reiterated

alleges his counsel’s deﬁcient performance led

we do

of counsel’s alleged

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would

Rodgers, 769 F.2d 1418, 1425

recently, the

the

defendant entered a plea 0f

that as a result

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going t0

United States

how

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the United Supreme Court clariﬁed

137 S.Ct. 1958, 1965 (2017).

Which he had a

However, in

E,

right.”

Lee

V.

_

U.S.

Supreme Court

also

United States,

the United States

cautioned that “[t]he strong societal interest in ﬁnality has special force with respect to convictions

based on guilty pleas,” and that “[c]0urts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc
assertions

Li.

E

from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but

instructs that “[j]udges should instead look to

for his attorney’s deﬁciencies.”

contemporaneous evidence to substantiate

a defendant’s expressed preferences.” Li.
In this case, as the state argued in

its

memorandum

in support

of its motion for summary

dismissal (R., p.189), the only factual allegation in Savage’s post-conviction petition relating to
the challenged ineffective assistance of

paragraph:

trial

counsel claim was contained in the following

I

asked [counsel]

criminal case

if

we

could postpone the

civil case

deposition until the

over. He told me probably not. Ithen asked him if I could plead
Amendment at the Deposition 0r if I could refuse t0 answer their
I had not yet made a plea in the criminal case. [Counsel] advised me

was

the Fifth (5th)

questions, as

answer or participate in the deposition [the opposing party] would
from Judge Watkins that would require me t0 answer all 0f their
questions under the penalty of perjury.

that if I refused to

get a [Court] Order

(R.,

p.16 (emphasis omitted).)
Implicit in this response

from counsel as reported by Savage

advised Savage that he could assert his Fifth

Amendment

rights

is

that counsel correctly

and refuse

t0 participate in the

deposition.

Similarly, the district court concluded that this claim

because Savage’s petition stated that his counsel did

tell

him

was contradicted by
that

the record

he could refuse to answer

questions in the civil deposition (though that such a reﬁlsal could, counsel allegedly stated, result
in a court order requiring

him

to answer).

(R., p.219;

ﬂ alﬂ

R., p.16 (relevant portion

conviction petition).) Therefore, based upon this reasoning as set forth

court,

Savage

failed t0 allege facts demonstrating deﬁcient

by the

state

of post-

and the

performance with respect t0

district

at least

a

portion 0f this claim.

However,

in

an afﬁdavit from

asserted that he informed Savage,

protections that

would preclude

trial

counsel submitted by the

among

state,

counsel additionally

other things that: (1) there were n0 guaranteed

his deposition testimony

from being used, despite objections,

in

the criminal case; and (2) should he refuse to participate in the deposition, the opposing party could

“probably” obtain a court order requiring participation, and that Savage could be ordered t0 pay
costs

and fees associated With obtaining and enforcing such an

10

order, or

be held in contempt.

(R.,

p.201.)

In light of these facts taken together,

it

appears that Savage alleged facts establishing a

prima facie case 0n the limited issue4 0f Whether counsel provided deﬁcient advice With respect to
the consequences 0f asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege at the deposition.

V.

E

North Carolina

Pearce, 395 U.S. 71 1 724 (1969) (holding that imposing a penalty for exercising a constitutional
,

right is “patently unconstitutional”), overruled

794 (1989); State

V.

Leﬂ<owitz

Amendment
V.

may not impose

right not t0 give incriminating testimony against himself.” (quoting

Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977)); United

Amendment

m,

703 F.2d 1983

summary

be held in

civil

States V. Edgerton,

contempt for

failing to answer,

on
V.

(10th Cir. 1983).

is still

not entitled to

relief,

and

this

Court must

dismissal order, because, as the state asserted in

its

still

afﬁrm the

district

motion for summary

dismissal, Savage failed t0 allege facts demonstrating Strickland prejudice

performance.

734 F.2d 913

grounds, the court’s questions regarding certain tax records); United States

However, Savage
court’s

Smith, 490 U.S.

substantial penalties because a Witness elects to exercise

(2nd Cir. 1983) (holding that taxpayer could not

Fifth

V.

Van Komen, 160 Idaho 534, 540, 376 P.3d 738, 744 (2016) (“[O]ur cases have

established that a State

his Fifth

0n other grounds bV Alabama

from any deﬁcient

Speciﬁcally, Savage failed to allege facts demonstrating that he

accepted the state’s plea offer absent the alleged deﬁcient performance in light

would not have

0f:

the lack of an

4

In his afﬁdavit, Savage’s trial counsel also made the assertion, Which Savage did not dispute, that
he correctly informed Savage that “Whatever he said while being deposed could likely be used

again him in the criminal case.” (R., p.201 .) Therefore, Savage has not alleged facts demonstrating
was deﬁcient With respect to the deposition’s impact on the criminal

his trial counsel’s advice

proceeding.

11

asserted factual nexus between the plea agreement and counsel’s allegedly deficient advice, the
strength of the state’s case even absent the incriminating statements made at the deposition, and
the nature of the plea agreement which provided Savage a motive to resolve the case.
Savage did not allege a factual nexus between his trial counsel’s advice with respect to the
Fifth Amendment and his decision to participate in the deposition and ultimately accept the state’s
plea offer. Instead, Savage’s argument and factual allegations were centered around his preamendment post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to intervene in
the civil case and file a motion to stay that proceeding. (R., pp.15-17, 21 (“But for [counsel’s]
errors in failing to file a motion to stay the civil court deposition and other proceedings[,] I
appeared at the deposition and answered all of the questions,” and “[a]t my meeting [after the
deposition] with [trial counsel and the prosecutor], [trial counsel] explained that this Transcript
from the Jan. 26, 2015 Deposition, was all the evidence need[ed] to prosecute me on the criminal
charges, so I better plead out and hope that the Court has mercy on me”).) While trial counsel’s
subsequently submitted affidavit provided additional facts regarding counsel’s alleged statements
to Savage about the consequences he could face if he exercised his Fifth Amendment rights,
Savage did not respond either to the state’s motion to dismiss or that affidavit, and thus never
submitted facts alleging that those statements prompted his decision to participate in the deposition
and ultimately plead guilty.
Likewise, a review of the facts of the case known to the state prior to the entry of Savage’s
guilty pleas demonstrates that the incriminating statements Savage made at the deposition
ultimately would have had little or no impact on the state’s ability to prove the charged crimes and,

12

thus,

would not have impacted plea negotiations or Savage’s willingness

offer.

t0 accept the state’s plea

Prior to the arson, the Idaho State Police installed a surveillance camera near the Victims’

residence due to vandalism committed against the resident’s patrol vehicle parked outside.

(#43474 PSI,

p.4.)

After the ﬁre (which

residence at 1:00 a.m. on

December

sidewalk near the residence.

(Id.)

was discovered by

awoke

the occupants as they

15, 2014), ofﬁcers located a gas

at the

can and a lighter 0n the

During the investigation, ofﬁcers learned

that

Savage was the

subject 0f a no-contact order protecting one 0f the residence’s occupants, Savage’s eX-wife’s

attorney.

(#43474 PSI, pp.4-5.)

When

ofﬁcers reviewed the Video surveillance footage, they

observed a vehicle driving by the Victims’ residence
before the ﬁre

was discovered.

(#43474 PSI,

identiﬁed the vehicle as belonging t0 Savage.

at

about 12:40 a.m., approximately 20 minutes

p.4.)

(Id.)

Savage’s eX-wife observed the Video and

Ofﬁcers also obtained surveillance Video from

a gas station showing Savage ﬁlling a gas can at approximately 12: 1 8

(Id.)

The gas can

in the Video

am.

the

matched the description 0f the gas can found

arson; and Savage’s vehicle as observed in the gas station Video

morning of the
at the

on the same date

as the arson.

(Id.)

Savage chose

in

Where he was

After he was arrested, Savage

was

ﬂ

211$

transported t0 the hospital t0 be treated for signiﬁcant burns to his face and hands.

#43474 PSI, pp.40-70

scene of the

matched the vehicle observed

the residence surveillance Video. (Id.) After the ﬁre, Savage traveled to Colorado,

arrested late at night

ﬁre.

(1d,;

(police reports describing these events).)

to take

advantage of a plea offer from the

state

which resulted in the dismissal

0f charges against him for telephone harassment and a second charge 0f Violation of a no-contact
order.

(#43474 PSI,

p.3;

#43474 3/24/15 TL,

p.4, L.7
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—

p.19, L.6.)

The

state also

agreed not to

ﬁle additional charges arising out of the various
charges related to

L.5.)

damage

t0 city property).

Savage thus had a disincentive

known incidents

(#43474 PSI,

p.3;

(except that the city could pursue

#43474 3/24/15

T11, p.4,

L.7 — p.9,

to assert his right to a jury trial, particularly in light

strength of the state’s case even absent the deposition admissions.

The

fact that

of the

Savage ultimately

received a sentence (a uniﬁed 19-year sentence with four years ﬁxed for ﬁrst—degree arson, later

reduced by one indeterminate year,
the sentence he

Tr.,

recommended

(a

ﬂ m,

2016

WL 2595962 at *1) signiﬁcantly higher than

uniﬁed seven 0r eight years with two years ﬁxed (#43474

pp.70-71)) presented a motive to

now

5/7/ 1 5

attempt t0 forgo the plea agreement and challenge the

conviction.

In light 0f these circumstances and the contemporaneous evidence available in the record,

Savage failed

t0 allege facts demonstrating that

decided to go t0

Amendment
court’s

trial

rights

he would have forgone the plea agreement and

absent any deﬁcient advice from his

and the

summary dismissal

civil

case deposition.

trial

counsel with respect to his Fifth

This Court must therefore afﬁrm the

district

order.

II.

Savage Has Failed T0 Show That The District Court Erred By Failing T0 Consider The Merits
His I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) Motion For Relief From Judgment
A.

Of

Introduction

Savage contends that the

district court erred

by declining

se I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-15.)
case so the district court can rule on the motion,

Savage has demonstrated he

is

or, in

to consider the merits

of his pro

He requests that this Court remand the

the alternative, that this Court conclude that

entitled t0 I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) relief. (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-17.)
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The

state

acknowledges that an I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion based upon alleged abandonment

0f post-conviction counsel
se

by

is

the type of motion a district court

a represented defendant.

this case reveal that

would

entitle

him

Savage cannot demonstrate the unique and compelling circumstances

court’s denial of the motion.

B.

Standard

However, a review 0f Savage’s motion and the circumstances of

t0 relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6).

merits of the motion

must consider even when ﬁled pro

is

Therefore, this Court must afﬁrm the district

In the alternative, the district court’s decision not t0 consider the

harmless.

Of Review

A district court’s decision granting or denying an I.R.C.P.
abuse 0f discretion. Agrisource, Inc.

“[W]hen

the discretion exercised

court’s role

Idaho

at

is

that

V.

by a

is

reviewed for an

Johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 914, 332 P.3d 815, 826 (2014).
trial

court

ordinarily t0 “note the error and

737, 228 P.3d at 1004.

60(b) motion

is

affected

remand the case

by an

error 0f law,” the appellate

for additional ﬁndings.” E_by, 148

Remand is not required, however,

if “there is

an alternative ground

for upholding the district court’s decision.” Li; accord Bias V. State, 159 Idaho 696, 706,

365 P.3d

1050, 1060 (Ct. App. 2015).

C.

Savage Cannot Show

He

Is Entitled

T0 Relief Under

I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a court t0 relieve a party from a ﬁnal judgment
or order for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)

newly discovered

evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time t0 move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (Whether heretofore denominated
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misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisﬁed, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon Which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, 0r it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other

prospective application; 0r (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation

0f the judgment.
I.R.C.P. 60(b).

the motion

V.

“Although the

district court

has broad discretion in deciding a Rule 60(b) motion,

may be granted only upon a showing of unique and compelling circumstances.” Palmer

Spain, 138 Idaho 798, 802, 69 P.3d 1059, 1063 (2003) (citing Miller

V.

Haller, 129 Idaho 345,

348, 924 P.2d 607, 610 (1996)).
In

m, 148 Idaho

“rare instances,” relief

at

732-738, 228 P.3d

at

from judgment pursuant

an attorney’s abandonment 0f his

999-1005, the Idaho Supreme Court held

t0 I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)

client in a prost-conviction proceeding,

a “complete absence of meaningful representation.

for inactivity after

79

The

district court

available based

upon

Where the record reﬂects
dismissed Eby’s petition

none of Eby’s appointed post-conviction attorneys ﬁled an amended petition or

any other substantive ﬁlings over the course of several
at

may be

that, in

years. E_by, 148 Idaho at 732-733,

228 P.3d

999-1000. The court then denied Eby’s I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment.

734, 228 P.3d at 1001.

The Idaho Supreme Court remanded

60(b)(6) relief may have been available t0

738, 228 P.3d at 1003-1005.

The Court

Eby under

I_d.

at

the case after concluding that I.R.CP.

the circumstances 0f that case.

reiterated that there is

no

I_d.

at

736-

right t0 the eﬂective assistance

0f post-conviction counsel, but that given the unique status of a post-conviction proceeding, the
“complete absence 0f meaningful representation”

may

present the “unique and compelling

circumstances” in which I.R.C.P. 60(b) relief may be warranted.
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Li

In

Andrus

V. State,

164 Idaho 565,

_, 433 P.3d 665, 666-667 (Ct. App. 2019), Andrus’

post-conviction counsel ﬁled n0 motions, documents, amendments, or pleadings in Andrus’ case,

amended petition. The

aside from a motion for extension 0f time t0 ﬁle an

dismissed Andrus’ petition 0n the record before

it.

subsequent I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion 0n the ground
petition

669.

was dismissed 0n

its

merits,

dismissal.

that,

The

Andrus

t0 the petition or additional facts 0r

summarily

then denied Andrus’

district court

unlike in E_by, Andrus’ post-conviction

0n the record before the

Further, the court concluded that

amendments

Li.

district court

failed to

district court.

show

I_d.

that there

at

_, 433 P.3d

were any

at

theoretical

arguments that would have prevented summary

Li

The Court oprpeals reversed the

denial order. Li. at

_, 433 P.3d

at

667-670. The Court

reasoned that because a post-conviction petitioner has a statutory right to the appointment of
counsel

When he has raised the possibility 0f a valid claim,

the merits of such claims unless the petitioner

developing or presenting his claims. Li.

Andrus was not required
dismissal. Li. at

need

t0

show

_, 433 P.3d

t0 establish “years

that

at 670.

at

available

had some assistance from appointed counsel

_, 433 P.3d at 669-680.

The Court

Further, the Court held that

also cautioned that while a petitioner does not

of shocking 0r disgraceﬁll neglect” as occurred in E_by t0 avail himself of

become

“the rule instead 0f the exception,” or

where counsel “performs some duties such

0r counsel participates

in

any attorney assistance would have prevented summary

I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) relief, such relief should not

become

a district court does not actually address

by pleading or appearance.”
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Li. at

that the claims

have been reviewed

_, 433 P.3d at 669.

In this case, after his post-conviction petition

I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)

motion requesting

was summarily dismissed, Savage ﬁled an
based upon alleged abandonment by his

relief from judgment

post-conviction counsel. (R., pp.226-237.) Speciﬁcally, Savage asserted that his post-conviction

counsel failed to communicate with

him

or provide

him with

copies of ﬁlings from the post-

conviction proceeding, and that this prevented Savage from responding to the state’s motion for

summary

dismissal and his

trial

counsel’s afﬁdavit.

(R.,

pp.229-233.)

Savage also submitted a

declaration asserting additional facts in support of his post-conviction claims.

Savage asserted that he would have provided these
aware of the

state’s

of the motion, stating that

ﬁled through Savage’s counsel of record.

The
that

state agrees

(R.,

it

pp.242-251.)

facts t0 his post-conviction counsel

motion for summary dismissal.

to consider the merits

(R.,

(R.,

had he been

pp.232-233.) The district court declined

would not consider any motions 0r requests not

pp.297-298.)

With Savage’s contention

made 0n

appeal (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-15),

an I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion alleging counsel abandonment

is

the type 0f motion concerning

an individual’s relationship With his attorneys that a court must consider when ﬁled by a pro se
individual. Indeed,

it is

likely that

most 0r

all I.R.C.P.

in controlling appellate decisions such as E_by

5

60(b)(6) motions (including those resulting

and Andrus), alleging a “complete absence 0f

_

n.2, 434 P.3d 224, 229 n.2 (2019), for example, the Idaho
Meyers, 164 Idaho 620,
that While judges generally should not permit 0r consider communications
made to the judge outside the presence of attorneys of record, a defendant’s attempted

In State

V.

Supreme Court noted

communication concerning a request

for the appointment of

new

counsel or an intention to

represent himself would be an appropriate matter for a clerk t0 bring t0 the judge’s attention, and

a matter that should then be brought to the attention 0f the parties to provide an opportunity t0
respond.
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meaningful representation” were initiated by pro se individuals

still

technically represented

by

their appointed post-conviction counsel.

However, Savage

still

cannot show he

is

entitled to relief,

because his I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)

motion did not allege a complete absence 0f post-conviction representation, nor does the record
support such a ﬁnding. In

M, 159 Idaho

at

705-707, 365 P.3d

at

1059-1061, Where the

district

court erred by failing to recognize Bias’s post-dismissal motion as being raised pursuant to I.R.C.P.
60(b), the Idaho Court of Appeals utilized the “right result

wrong theory”6

principle to consider

the merits of the motion.

many

Savage’s appointed post-conviction counsel (unlike
attorneys), ﬁled a

claims.

(R.,

supplement to Savage’s pro se petition which amended and clariﬁed Savage’s

pp.179-181.)

This

amendment was

ineffective assistance 0f trial counsel claim

t0 stay the civil proceeding, a case in

The

state recognizes that in State V.

the Idaho

Supreme Court held

particularly effective With respect to the

Savage challenges in

transformed a claim that plainly had no merit (that

6

appointed post—conviction

Which, as

trial

trial

Appointed counsel

counsel was ineffective for failing to

move

counsel explained in his afﬁdavit, he had n0

P.3d

Hoskins,

this appeal.

that the “right result,

,

2019

WL 2462693

(Idaho 2019),

wrong-theory rule” does not require

consider an Respondent’s unpreserved argument for afﬁrming a district court order.

it

to

The Court

reasoned, in part, that where one party did not have adequate opportunity or motive to respond in
the lower court to an argument raised for the ﬁrst time
the appellate court to resolve the case

on

that issue.

0n appeal, then

Hoskins, 2019

it

would be improper for
The present

WL 2462693.

not-uncommon situation where a district court rules 0n a motion that the other
party has not responded t0. The state submits that the “right result, wrong-theory rule” may apply
case presents the

in such circumstances

Where a motion

fails as

a matter of law as presented t0 the lower court,

particularly where, as in this case, the appellant raised the relevant appellate issue below.

Or, in

the alternative, as discussed below, the appellate court should consider Whether the motion

meritorious 0n

its

face in the context of a harmless error analysis.
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was

authority to intervene in), into a claim that the state has

case of deﬁcient counsel performance (that

now acknowledged

raised a prima facie

counsel was ineffective for advising Savage that

trial

he potentially faced penalties should he assert his Fifth Amendment rights against
incrimination at the civil deposition).

circumstances, Savage cannot

show

(Compare

entitle

162 Idaho 520, 522-524, 399 P.3d 847, 849-851

t0 demonstrate

ﬂ

p.21

R.,

p.180.)

Under these

the “unique and compelling circumstances” of a “complete

absence ofmeaningful representation” that would

M,

R.,

self-

him t0 I.R.C.P.
(Ct.

60(b)(6) relief.

E

m

App. 2017) (holding that Devan failed

“complete absence 0f meaningful representation” even Where counsel failed t0 ﬁle

a response t0 the state’s motion t0 dismiss, and declining to read E_by t0 “open the door t0 challenge
the effectiveness of post—conviction counsel

Finally,

even When the

be deemed harmless

trial

by Virtue of a Rule

court has abused

if a substantial right is

its

(60)(b) motion”).

discretion, such “abuse

not affected.”

0f discretion

may

State V. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355,

363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010); accord I.R.C.P. 61 (“At every stage of the proceeding, the court

must disregard

all errors

and defects

Kirk—Scott Ltd., 157 Idaho 966,
any, in denying Rule 60(b)

motion was Without

merit).

that

d0 not

affect

motion 0n grounds

Golub

V.

it

was untimely was harmless where, on

its

face,

In this case, in the alternative, any district court error for failing t0

discussed above, the motion was meritless 0n
dissatisfaction

constitute the unique

rights.”);

_, 342 P.3d 893, 900 n.4 (2015) (the district court’s error, if

consider the merits of Savage’s I.R.C.P. 60(b) claim

Savage’s

any party’s substantial

its

was harmless because,

for all of the reasons

face.

with his post-conviction

counsel’s

performance does not

and compelling circumstances required before a court
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may

grant relief

pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). This Court should reject Savage’s invitation t0 expand the scope of
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) t0 such cases.

relief, this

Because Savage cannot show he

Court should afﬁrm the

district court’s denial

is

entitled t0 I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)

0f his I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s

order summarily

dismissing Savage’s post-conviction petition, and the district court’s order denying Savage’s
I.R.C.P. 60(b)

motion for

relief from judgment.

DATED this 20th day of June, 2019.
Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
/s/

Deputy Attorney General
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and Serve:

BRIAN R. DICKSON
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Mark W. Olson
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